The Pollution Effect: Optimizing Keyword Auctions by Favoring Relevant
  Advertising by Linden, Greg et al.
The Pollution Effect: Optimizing Keyword Auctions by 
Favoring Relevant Advertising 
 
Greg Linden 
Geeky Ventures
1
 
Seattle, WA 98112 
glinden@gmail.com 
 
Christopher Meek 
Microsoft Research 
Redmond, WA 98052 
meek@microsoft.com 
Max Chickering 
Microsoft 
Redmond, WA 98052 
dmax@microsoft.com 
 
ABSTRACT 
Most search engines sell slots to place advertisements on the 
search results page through keyword auctions.  Advertisers offer 
bids for how much they are willing to pay when someone enters a 
search query, sees the search results, and then clicks on one of 
their ads.  Search engines typically order the advertisements for a 
query by a combination of the bids and expected clickthrough 
rates for each advertisement. In this paper, we extend a model of 
Yahoo‟s and Google‟s advertising auctions to include an effect 
where repeatedly showing less relevant ads has a persistent impact 
on all advertising on the search engine, an impact we designate as 
the pollution effect.  In Monte-Carlo simulations using 
distributions fitted to Yahoo data, we show that a modest 
pollution effect is sufficient to dramatically change the advertising 
rank order that yields the optimal advertising revenue for a search 
engine.  In addition, if a pollution effect exists, it is possible to 
maximize revenue while also increasing advertiser, and publisher 
utility.  Our results suggest that search engines could benefit from 
making relevant advertisements less expensive and irrelevant 
advertisements more costly for advertisers than is the current 
practice. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences –
Economics 
General Terms 
Economics, Theory 
Keywords 
Sponsored search, search engines, keyword auctions, auction 
theory, search advertising, web advertising, advertising auctions 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Microsoft Live Search, Yahoo, Google, and other web search 
engines sell the right to show advertisements in slots placed on the 
search results page.  Search engines solicit bids from advertisers 
on how much they are willing to pay for a click on their ad when a 
searcher is viewing the search results for a list of queries.  When a 
query comes into a search engine, in addition to finding search 
results for the query, the search engine picks a selection of 
advertisements to show for the query.  Search engines rank order 
the candidate advertisements by a combination of the amount the 
advertiser bid and the estimated probability that searchers will 
click the advertisement, then pick the top candidates as the ads to 
show. 
For example, several advertisers may be interested in clicks by 
searchers who search for [credit card].  By offering bids on the 
term [credit card], the advertiser can attract traffic to their website.  
On a search for [credit card], the search engine will look at all the 
advertisers who bid on this query, rank order the advertisers 
primarily by a combination of the bid and how likely searchers 
appear to be to clicking on the ad for this advertiser, and display a 
selection of the top ranked ads. 
Although advertisers are bidding on clicks, the search engines are 
selling impressions, the space on the page.  Clicks are related to 
impressions by the clickthrough rate (CTR), which is the 
probability of clicking on an advertisement when it is displayed.  
The CTR of an advertisement depends not only on the relevance 
of the advertisement, but also on its position.  All else being 
equal, ads in higher positions on the page have a higher likelihood 
of being seen by searchers and attract more clicks. 
Historically, Yahoo and Google used different rankings of 
candidate advertisements.  Yahoo ranked candidates in decreasing 
order of their bids. Google ranked candidates in decreasing order 
of the bid multiplied by the estimated CTR of the ad (i.e. 𝐵𝑖𝑑 ×
𝐶𝑇𝑅).  The first approach ranks the ads by the value per click; the 
second ranks by the value per impression.  Currently, Yahoo, 
Google, Microsoft Live Search, and most other web search 
engines use value per impression as the primary factor to rank 
order the candidate advertisements. 
Previous work by Lahaie [1] modeled and analyzed a family of 
ranking rules of the form 𝐵𝑖𝑑 × 𝐶𝑇𝑅∝. This family of rules 
includes the old Yahoo value per click, the current value per 
impression model used by most search engines, as well as 
combinations of the two. In Monte-Carlo simulations that used 
distributions based on Yahoo bid and clickthrough data for a 
specific high-volume keyword, this earlier work found that the 
optimal setting of alpha to maximize revenue was 0, which is 
equivalent to the older Yahoo model of ordering advertisements 
by the value of the bids. 
In this paper, we reproduce the simulations and results of [1] and 
then extend the model they used to include what we call the 
pollution effect, the impact of repeatedly showing searchers 
irrelevant advertisements that do not attract clicks.  We argue that 
the primary reason that we see the pollution effect exists is that 
searchers who see irrelevant advertisements look at all 
advertisements less in the future, a phenomenon known as ad 
fatigue. 
Our new model that includes a pollution effect is a simple and 
reasonable extension of the model used in [1].  Our major change 
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from previous work is to make small changes in the CTR 
distribution as alpha changes.  The authors of the earlier work 
used a CTR distribution derived from empirical data at a specific 
alpha setting.  However, different settings of alpha almost 
certainly will change the advertisements shown, impact both 
advertiser and user behavior, and change the CTR distributions.  
Our model of the pollution effect uses slightly different CTR 
distributions as alpha is changed.  
Monte-Carlo simulations based on our new model suggest that, 
for the advertising ranking functions commonly used by search 
engines, 𝐵𝑖𝑑 × 𝐶𝑇𝑅∝, the optimal setting of alpha is at least 1.  
This result disagrees with the conclusion of previous work, but 
confirms the current settings used by major search engines, all of 
which use an alpha setting of 1. In addition, our results suggest 
that even higher settings of alpha may increase publisher, 
advertiser, and user utility simultaneously. 
The contributions of our paper are a simple and plausible model 
for the impact less relevant ads have on other ads over time, 
simulations using that model that show the ranking function that 
will optimize revenue, and results that suggest that higher settings 
of alpha may be optimal.  More generally, our work indicates that 
search engines may be missing a substantial opportunity to 
increase value for searchers, advertisers, and themselves by not 
having much higher penalties on advertisements that searchers do 
not find relevant. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Our work can be seen as building on the work of [1], using a 
similar model, comparable Monte-Carlo simulations, and their 
probability distributions derived from Yahoo data.  However, our 
conclusions are dramatically different, suggesting that search 
engines should heavily favor advertising that searchers find more 
relevant.  We show the conclusions of past work are sensitive to 
an implicit assumption that overall CTR is independent of the 
setting of alpha for the ranking function. We relax this assumption 
using a plausible relationship between overall CTR and the setting 
of alpha.  We show that the new model has different conclusions 
about the optimal setting of alpha.  Our models support the current 
search engines rank ordering of advertising by 𝐵𝑖𝑑 × 𝐶𝑇𝑅∝ where 
alpha = 1, but also suggest that alpha > 1 to further favor relevant 
advertising may lead to higher long-term revenue. Therefore, our 
contributions to earlier work are a new model that includes the 
pollution effect and new conclusions about the optimal rank order 
for advertisements given the existence of the pollution effect. 
Lahaie [5] describes a theoretical framework on which his later 
work [1] was based.  Our work also benefits from the framework 
described in this paper. 
The papers of Varian [2] [3], Athey et al. [12], and Edelman et al. 
[4] lay the foundation for our work.  These papers discuss 
keyword auctions, the models used by Yahoo and Google, how 
the auctions encourage advertisers to be truthful about their actual 
value of a click, and how they maximize revenue.  One of these 
papers, Varian [2], includes a section on “ad quality” that states 
that “showing a „bad ad‟ can affect users‟ future propensity to 
click.”  Our work extends Varian‟s statement with a simple and 
plausible model of how irrelevant advertisements can affect user‟s 
future propensity to click and shows the optimal ranking function 
for advertisements under that model.  In addition to a detailed 
discussion of auction models, Athey et al. [12] mention that 
welfare can be hurt by irrelevant advertisements and briefly 
discuss a detailed model of consumer behavior that includes 
consumer belief in the quality of a publisher and relevance of 
advertisements.  However, they do not explore the possibility of a 
drop in welfare in depth. 
A few recent papers have touched on the idea that irrelevant 
advertisements may have a negative impact on other 
advertisements.  Perhaps most related to our work is Ghosh et al. 
[6] with their discussion of an “externality effect” in advertising 
where the utility of a winner also depends on the other winners.  
However, they only look at the impact of an ad on other ads in the 
same auction, not across time, and are not modeling the idea that 
an irrelevant ad can have a long-term impact on all other 
advertisements by causing searchers to look at advertisements less 
frequently. Broder et al. [13] argue that irrelevant advertisements 
annoy users and provide no economic benefit, then examine a 
machine learning approach to learning when not to show 
advertisements.  However, the authors do not model a pollution 
effect where irrelevant advertisements reduce future clicks on all 
other advertisements and they leave considering user ad fatigue to 
future work.  Gunawardana et al. [7] consider the negative impact 
ad aggregators may have on other advertisers, but do not develop 
this into a more general model.  Abrams [14] offer a technique for 
charging the cost of irrelevant advertisements to search engines 
back to the advertisers, but ignore the impact of irrelevant 
advertisements on searchers and other advertisers. 
3. POLLUTION EFFECT 
Our model includes a pollution effect, an externality where 
advertisements can impact other advertisements in the auction.  In 
particular, we include an effect where each time a searcher sees 
irrelevant advertisements, they have a greater tendency to assume 
all future advertisements will be irrelevant, and so have a lower 
likelihood of viewing them.  That is, advertisements that are not 
relevant cause searchers to have a lower probability of looking at 
the advertising section of the search result page. 
We assume that the pollution effect is uniform across all ads; a 
searcher either decides to look at the advertising section of the 
page or ignores the entire section.  We also assume the choice to 
look at the advertising section is independent of the choice to not 
look at the next ad when reading all the ads, so that it is 
reasonable to consider the model of position bias independently of 
the model of the pollution effect.  
We choose a simple and abstract model of the pollution effect that 
merely shifts the CTR distribution for all of the advertisements.  
This represents searchers looking at the advertisements less 
frequently, reducing the clicks all advertisements receive 
uniformly.   
In our work, we shift the CTR distribution as alpha changes, 
taking advantage of the inverse relationship between alpha and the 
relevance of advertisements shown.  To see this relationship, note 
that since we are ordering the advertisements by 𝐵𝑖𝑑 × 𝐶𝑇𝑅∝, for 
the same bids, lower values of alpha will cause advertisements 
with lower CTR to be featured more prominently.  Likewise, 
higher alpha values will tend to move higher CTR ads to better 
positions.  When higher CTR ads have a greater likelihood of 
appearing in the top slots, they have a higher likelihood of being 
seen, so the average relevance of the advertisements will be 
higher.  We confirm this relationship between alpha and CTR in 
our simulations as described later in this paper. 
Rather than shift the CTR distribution, another choice may be to 
attempt to explicitly model the pollution caused by each 
individual advertisement each time it is shown (e.g. [12]).  
However, this choice would introduce much complexity and many 
new parameters when we are primarily interested in aggregate 
effects in this work.  Our model does not capture short-term 
effects when alpha changes, but a new, shifted CTR distribution 
will capture the long-term steady state after a change in alpha.  
Once searchers have adjusted to a given setting of alpha, the CTR 
distribution describes how people view and click on ads.  Our 
approach to understanding the impact of a pollution effect was to 
seek the simplest model we could find that could still yield insight 
on the pollution effect in advertising auction.  Shifting the CTR 
distributions as alpha changes appears to be a simple, plausible, 
and effective model of the pollution effect.   
4. POLLUTION TAX 
A pollution tax may be an instructive framework for thinking 
about how to deal with the pollution effect in advertising auctions.  
A pollution tax attempts to fix an externality by requiring an extra 
payment to compensate those impacted by pollution that 
otherwise would not be compensated.  In advertising auctions, we 
could add a penalty that resembles a pollution tax that is intended 
to make advertisers pay the full cost of showing a bad 
advertisement.  If showing an irrelevant advertisement causes 
searchers to now look at all ads slightly less frequently, the other 
advertisers should be compensated for their loss. 
Ideally, a pollution tax should match the full cost of the pollution 
to all others.  In an advertising auction, a pollution tax should 
charge irrelevant advertisements for the cost to all other 
advertisements, which should be calculated in part based on the 
drop in likelihood that the searchers will look at the advertising 
section. 
In our model, we use the implied pollution tax from higher 
settings of the alpha parameter when ordering the advertisements 
by 𝐵𝑖𝑑 × 𝐶𝑇𝑅∝.  We assume that when a searcher clicks on an ad, 
that person found the ad useful, so we effectively are using CTR 
as a proxy for user utility (in practice, this assumption can be 
violated, which we discuss further in Section 5.2).  Therefore, 
when ranking by 𝐵𝑖𝑑 × 𝐶𝑇𝑅∝,  higher values of alpha will charge 
irrelevant advertisements more.  Using Monte-Carlo simulation, 
we determine the ideal surcharge embedded in the ideal setting of 
alpha. 
Rather than representing a pollution tax in alpha, another choice 
may have been to explicitly model the pollution tax as a separate 
term (e.g. [14]), either in aggregate or individually for each 
advertisement.  However, this choice would introduce much new 
complexity to the model.  We sought to use the simplest model 
possible that could still represent a pollution tax.  We also sought 
to make as few changes as possible to the family of ranking rules 
𝐵𝑖𝑑 × 𝐶𝑇𝑅∝ that are currently used by most search engines for 
advertising auctions. Embedding the pollution tax in the alpha 
parameter introduces no additional complexity while still allowing 
us to examine a range of advertising ranking functions that make 
advertisements that searchers find irrelevant more costly. 
5. MODEL 
We examine a family of ranking functions of the form 𝐵𝑖𝑑 ×
𝐶𝑇𝑅∝.  When alpha is 0, the advertisements are ordered by bid, 
which is equivalent to the old Yahoo model.  When alpha is 1, the 
advertisements are ordered by value per impression, which is the 
ranking function currently used by most search engines.  Alpha 
values in the range [0,1] yield models that are combinations of the 
old and new Yahoo ranking functions, and so weight bids more 
heavily than is common.   
Alpha values above 1 penalize advertisements that have low 
clickthrough rates (or, equivalently, subsidize advertisements that 
searchers click on frequently) and are not common in practice.  
Since we reproduce the results of previous work [1] as well as 
extending it, we explore negative alpha values in the range [-2, 0] 
as the earlier work did, but we should note that those ranking 
functions are usually considered impractical given that they have 
an undesirable effect of strongly favoring advertisements that get 
few clicks. 
We model the advertising placements as K slots for 
advertisements for which there are N bidders.  We assume that K 
< N for the purposes of the model and the simulations.  This 
assumption does not limit the generality of our results since 
auctions with fewer advertisers than slots could fit the model as a 
reserve price beyond which the placement is more valuable to the 
search engine left empty or as advertisers paying nothing for the 
placement. 
Position bias is the tendency of searchers to view and click 
advertisements in lower positions less often than advertisements 
in higher positions.  We assume the position bias on the 
advertisements – the tendencies of ads in lower slots to be seen 
and clicked less frequency – is independent of the advertisements 
and the query.  Therefore, we assume the CTR of an ad can be 
estimated independently of its position and assume that unbiased 
CTR is available for our ranking function.  We label the position 
bias at slot i in the advertisements as xi, label the CTR of the ad in 
slot i as CTRi, and define the actual CTR an ad gets in slot i as 
𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖 × 𝑥𝑖 . 
We model generalized second price auctions, so we set the 
advertiser payments for a click not at the bid, but at the lowest bid 
necessary to maintain the position.  For example, if there are two 
advertisements, one with a bid of $3, the other $2, and both have a 
CTR of 1%, then the first advertisement would get the top 
position, but only pay $2, not $3.  In general, the amount the 
advertiser at slot i  pays for an ad is 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖+1 ×
𝑤𝑖+1
𝑤𝑖
, where i+1 is 
the advertisement that wins the slot immediately below 
advertisement at slot i and 𝑤𝑖 = (𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖)
∝. 
We assume that bidders are rational and are playing as best they 
can given the other bids and bidders in the auction.  As in [1] and 
as supported by [3], we assume that bidders are playing the 
smallest symmetric equilibrium, which causes bidders to be 
ranked in decreasing order of 𝑤𝑖 × 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 , where 𝑤𝑖 = (𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖)
∝ 
and 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖  is the unknown true value of a click to the bidder.  For 
further discussion of symmetric equilibrium (which is sometimes 
referred to as “locally envy-free equilibrium”) and truth telling in 
advertising auctions, we refer the reader to [1], [2], [3], [4], and 
[12]. 
We assume exact match for the keyword auctions, meaning that 
advertisers must bid on the query exactly to be eligible for a slot.  
In practice, search engines do fuzzy matching between the 
keywords bid and the search query terms, sometimes even 
showing the advertisements for different queries than the bidded 
terms if they appear to be semantically or behaviorally related.  
However, this added complication would add nothing to our 
model nor would it change our conclusions. 
5.1 Revenue 
We assume the goal of the search engine is to maximize long-term 
revenue from its advertisements. Therefore, the search engine 
should choose a ranking function that accomplishes this goal. 
Since these are generalized second price auctions, the price 
actually paid for an ad is the minimum bid necessary to maintain 
position, or 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖+1 ×
𝑤 𝑖+1
𝑤 𝑖
, where 𝑤𝑖 = (𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖)
∝, as described 
earlier.  This price is only paid when the ad is clicked, so the 
revenue for a single ad will be (𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖 × 𝑥𝑖) × 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖+1 ×
𝑤𝑖+1
𝑤𝑖
.  The 
revenue for all the ads on a search result page, therefore, will be 
 (CTRixi)Bidi+1
wi+1
wi
𝐾
𝑖=1
 
And, the total revenue for the search engine overall will the sum 
of the revenue of each search result page. 
Although advertisers do not necessarily bid their true value, we 
can state the revenue as a function of advertiser value when the 
bids stabilize under the assumption of symmetric equilibrium.  
The revenue for one ad on a search result page will be 
CTRi × xi × Bidi+1 ×
wi+1
wi
= 
 CTRi(xj−xj+1)Valuej+1
wj+1
wi
𝐾
𝑗=𝑖
 
where K is the number of ads in the auction.  Intuitively, the bid 
of an advertiser depends on the actions of all the other advertisers, 
but the bids in the auction will settle into a steady state that 
depends on the value each the advertisers place on a click. 
The total revenue of an auction, stated as a function of advertiser 
value, will then be 
  CTRi(xj−xj+1)Valuej+1
wj+1
wi
𝐾
𝑗=𝑖
𝐾
𝑖=1
 
And, the total revenue for the search engine overall will be the 
sum across all auctions. 
Please see [1] for further discussion of symmetric equilibrium and 
the derivation of revenue as a function of advertiser value. 
5.2 Relevance 
Relevance is a measure of the utility of the advertisements to 
searchers.  Advertisements often contain information about 
products and services that may be useful to the person executing 
the search.   
A search engine needs to balance the needs of searchers against its 
own goals.  If searchers constantly find the advertisements 
irrelevant and uninformative, they will stop looking at them [9].  
In this work, we use CTR as a proxy for user utility.  The 
assumption is that when a searcher clicks on an ad, that person 
found the ad useful.  In practice, this assumption can be violated 
by deceptive advertising; we assume that techniques to detect and 
eliminate clicks on deceptive ads – such as dropping clicks where 
the searcher leaves the advertising site immediately – are already 
part of our CTR.  We also assume that we can estimate CTR 
accurately even for new ads.  In practice, accurately estimating 
clickthrough rate given limited actual click data is a hard problem 
(see, for example, [10]). 
Therefore, we define the relevance of an ad in slot i as its actual 
clickthrough rate,𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖 × 𝑥𝑖 , where xi is the position bias for slot i.  
The total relevance of the advertisements on a search result page 
will be 
 CTRixi
𝐾
𝑖=1
 
and will vary depending on the ranking function because which 
ads are selected for which positions change with the ranking 
function.  The total relevance for the search engine is the sum of 
the relevance of each search result page. 
Previous work (e.g. [1]) assumed that the relevance distribution of 
the ads is independent of the setting of alpha.  In our model, we 
change the relevance distribution for the ads as alpha changes.  In 
this way, our model includes an effect where, when the 
advertising section of a page becomes less relevant to searchers, 
searchers start looking at all the ads less frequently. 
5.3 Efficiency 
Efficiency is a measure of advertiser satisfaction.  It is the total 
value an advertiser receives from the auction.  Efficiency for a 
single advertiser is 𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖 × 𝑥𝑖 × 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 .  Efficiency of the 
advertisements in all slots on a search result page will be 
 CTRixi
𝐾
𝑖=1
Valuei 
The total efficiency of the search engine will be the sum of the 
efficiency of each search result page. 
The efficiency can be interpreted as the revenue paid to the search 
engine plus the excess value the advertiser keeps in a generalized 
second price auction from the minimum necessary to maintain 
their position rather than their bid.  This is easy to see if we break 
the efficiency the first equation above into two terms, one for the 
revenue for the search engine and one for the excess value 
retained by the advertiser 
CTRi × xi × Valuei = 
CTRi × xi × pi + CTRi × xi × (Valuei − pi) 
where pi is the price paid for the for the advertisement, so  
𝑝𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖+1 ×
𝑤𝑖+1
𝑤𝑖
. 
6. SIMULATIONS 
To determine the impact of different settings of alpha, we created 
a Monte-Carlo simulation of millions of advertising auctions, then 
examined the impact of the setting of alpha on revenue, relevance, 
and efficiency.  We then created a dependency between alpha and 
the relevance distribution for the advertisements to determine how 
sensitive the optimal setting of alpha is to an assumption of 
independence. 
In the Monte-Carlo simulation, for additional realism, we used the 
marginal distributions from [1] that the authors derived from 
empirical Yahoo bid and clickthrough data for a high volume 
keyword.  Specifically, as in the previous work, we used a 
lognormal distribution fitted to the empirical data for the value of 
a click (mean of 0.35 and stddev of 0.71), and a beta distribution 
fitted to the CTR data (alpha of 2.71, beta of 25.43).   
 
 
Figure 1: Lognormal marginal distribution of value derived 
from empirical Yahoo data.  
 
 
Figure 2: The beta marginal probability distribution for the 
relevance of an advertisement derived from empirical Yahoo 
data. 
Our Monte-Carlo simulation was for a total of 9.6 million 
auctions of search result pages with 12 slots and 13 bidders.  We 
drew advertiser bids the CTR of the ad randomly for each of the 
13 advertisers from the distributions above, then simulated an 
auction for the advertisers, ranking them by 𝐵𝑖𝑑 × 𝐶𝑇𝑅∝, then 
computing the revenue, relevance, and efficiency.  We repeated 
this for all alpha in the range [-2,2] in 0.1 increments, calculating 
the total revenue, relevance, and efficiency for each setting of 
alpha. 
The empirical data from [1] showed a positive Spearman 
correlation of 0.4 between the value of an advertisement to an 
advertiser and the CTR of the ad.  We used a Gaussian copula – a 
method from finance of creating a joint distribution from two 
marginal distributions – to allow the Monte-Carlo simulation to 
represent this dependence.  We simulated a wide range of possible 
correlations between value and relevance, but focused our 
attention on the most realistic correlation of 0.4. 
We modeled position bias using the positional effects observed in 
Yahoo empirical data from [1].  We choose using the Yahoo data 
over a simpler model of bias both to be able to replicate the results 
of previous work and to increase the realism of our simulations. 
Before we attempted to analyze the impact of the pollution effect, 
we ran our simulations using these parameters, which we sought 
to make identical to the parameters used in [1].  Our goal was to 
reproduce the results in previous work before extending their 
model.  Our results, presented in the next section, show that these 
simulations yielded the same results and conclusions as the earlier 
work.  In particular, our results also showed a setting of alpha of 0 
was optimal.  
Finally, we consider an aggregate model for the pollution effect. 
Previous work assumed independence between alpha and the 
relevance distribution.  Our concern is that the Yahoo empirical 
data was taken from advertising auctions run with one particular 
setting of alpha.  We suspected that the empirical data and hence 
the relevance distribution would be quite different if taken from 
advertising auctions with a different setting of alpha. 
For intuition on why this might be the case, take the example of 
where alpha is set to -1.  This setting of alpha charges less to 
advertisements that do not get clicks.  The advertisements winning 
the top slots likely would be advertisements on which searchers 
do not click. After being shown these advertisements repeatedly, 
searchers likely would start perceiving all the advertisements as 
irrelevant and stop looking the ads. 
We represented the pollution effect by slightly shifting the 
relevance curve as alpha changes.  Specifically, we set the beta 
parameter of the relevance beta distribution at 25.43, as derived in 
[1] for empirical data when alpha was 1, but then we change the 
beta parameter over the range [18.43,46.43] as alpha changes in 
the range [-2, 2].  This smoothly shifts the CTR distribution to the 
left as alpha drops to 0 and below, representing the decreasing 
likelihood that searchers will view and click on ads after 
continually being shown irrelevant ads.  Likewise, the CTR 
distribution shifts slightly to the right as alpha increases beyond 1, 
representing the increasing likelihood that searchers will view and 
click on ads after repeatedly being shown useful ads. 
With this simple model, we are able to simulate what happens if 
the auction makes it easier for less relevant ads to appear.  
Searchers are likely to suffer ad fatigue and look advertisements 
less frequently when they see irrelevant ads.  If the search engine 
makes it less expensive for irrelevant ads to appear and starts 
showing irrelevant ads more prominently, it will cause ad fatigue.  
We call this the pollution effect of irrelevant ads.  Our model 
represents the pollution effect by shifting the relevance 
distribution. 
The chart below shows the shifts in the relevance distributions 
that we used in our simulations for alpha in the range [0, 1.5]. 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Value
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27
Relevance
  
Figure 3: Relevance distribution curves as alpha changes from 
[0,1.5].  The green line for alpha = 1 is the original relevance 
distribution. 
The shifts in the CTR distribution are quite modest over the 
realistic range of alpha of [0, 1.5].  With this simple model, we 
can capture differences in how searchers view and click on 
advertisements when they are shown more or fewer irrelevant 
advertisements.  We believe that this shift in the CTR distribution 
is a reasonable and conservative approximation of the pollution 
effect that search engines see in practice. 
7. RESULTS 
We ran two groups of simulations, the first with an assumption 
that the relevance distribution for the ads remains constant 
regardless of the ads users see, the second designed to relax the 
assumption of independence between alpha and the relevance 
distribution and examine the impact of one plausible shift in the 
relevance distribution as alpha changes.  The first was intended to 
reproduce the results of previous work, the second to extend 
previous work to include the pollution effect. 
The results from the first group of simulations establishes that the 
optimal setting of alpha to maximize revenue is 0 when ranking 
advertisements by 𝐵𝑖𝑑 × 𝐶𝑇𝑅∝.  This confirms the results of 
previous work [1] where their simulations also found an optimal 
setting of alpha at 0.  Figure 4 below shows total revenue 
normalized to the range [0,1] for alpha in the range [-2,2] using 
Yahoo‟s empirically observed correlation of 0.4 between the 
value distribution and the relevance distribution.  
 
 
Figure 4: Normalized total revenue for alpha in [-2,2]. 
The revenue peaks when alpha is at 0.  This means that revenue is 
maximized when we order advertisements almost entirely by their 
bids.  Note that this is equivalent to the old Yahoo auctions where 
they would order by value per click, but that all major search 
engines currently order their advertisements by value per 
impression (alpha = 1).   
Total efficiency for the auctions is shown below. 
 
Figure 5: Normalized total efficiency for alpha in [-2,2]. 
Recall that total efficiency is the sum of the value to the search 
engine and to the advertiser.  It is interesting that efficiency is 
essentially flat over the range [0, 2], meaning that the total value 
created and shared by advertiser and search engine is the same 
over a wide range. 
Total relevance for the auctions is shown below.  While total 
revenue (in Figure 4) peaked at alpha of 0, the total relevance 
shows a much different pattern. 
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 Figure 6: Normalized total relevance for alpha in [-2,2]. 
This graph makes the relationship between alpha and relevance 
clear.  Relevance increases as alpha increases.  This result 
confirms our earlier claim that a strong relationship exists 
between alpha and relevance.  It suggests that the irrelevant ads 
will be shown more prominently as alpha decreases and the 
overall CTR rates for the auctions will change.  In our second 
round of simulations, we will use a model that shifts the relevance 
distribution as alpha changes. 
Looking at all three graphs, as in the previous results, it appears 
we can optimize revenue while also nearly optimizing efficiency 
with a setting of alpha near 0.  However, the same cannot be said 
of relevance.  It seems we cannot make the search engine happy 
without hurting searchers; we cannot maximize the usefulness of 
the advertisements to users without impacting revenue. 
Our results from our second round of simulations show that this 
tradeoff disappears once we include the pollution effect in our 
model.  The new model shifts the CTR distribution as alpha 
changes.  The old model used in previous work assumed that the 
empirically observed relevance distribution from an alpha of 1 
would apply to other settings of alpha. As we have argued and as 
results from the simulations show, changing alpha will make it 
easier for irrelevant ads to appear and likely will cause searchers 
to look at all advertisements less frequently.  Our new model 
includes this effect. 
In the second round of simulations, we slightly changed the mean 
of the CTR distribution for the advertisements as described 
earlier.  Our results from this group of simulations show that alpha 
in the range [0.3, 2.0] now optimizes revenue. 
 
Figure 7: Normalized total revenue for alpha in [-2,2], with 
pollution effect, CTR distribution changing with alpha. 
The revenue now appears to be essentially flat a broad range of 
alpha settings.  A detailed look at the data shows the maximum to 
be at alpha 1.5 and above, but that any value in the range [0.3, 
2.0] is close to maximizing revenue. 
With the new model, no longer do we see a sharp peak near alpha 
of 0.  In fact, it appears that the search engine could be essentially 
indifferent to a wide range of alpha values, perhaps allowing 
alpha to be determined based on other factors.   
The following graph compares the revenue as alpha changes 
under the new model with the pollution effect and old model from 
previous work. 
 
Figure 8: Normalized total revenue for alpha in [-2,2] 
comparing revenue curves with the pollution effect (in blue) 
and without (in gray). 
Total efficiency and total relevance for the second round of 
auctions are shown below.  Note that the total relevance and total 
efficiency keep increasing as alpha increases. 
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 Figure 9: Normalized total efficiency for alpha in [-2,2] with 
pollution effect,  CTR distribution changing with alpha. 
 
Figure 10: Normalized total relevance for alpha in [-2,2] with 
pollution effect,  CTR distribution changing with alpha. 
Once we included a pollution effect, both efficiency and relevance 
increase nearly linearly as alpha increases.  The higher the alpha, 
the more combined value is created for advertisers and the search 
engine (efficiency) and the more searchers like the advertisements 
(relevance). 
Higher settings of alpha mean that advertisements with higher 
CTR will get higher position for the same bid.  In essence, 
relevant advertisements are being given a discount to maintain the 
same position.  If relevant advertisements maintain their bids, they 
will tend to be featured more prominently and seen more 
frequently.  Likewise, irrelevant advertisements require higher 
bids to maintain their position and therefore will tend to be shown 
less frequently.  Because the average advertisement will be more 
relevant to searchers, searchers will tend to look at the 
advertisements more frequently and click on them more often.   
As a result, overall value the search engine creates for advertisers 
and the search engine combined increases.  However, the search 
engine revenue does not increase since the search engine is 
discounting relevant advertising to attract more searcher attention 
to the advertising.   
Considering the impact to revenue alone, the search engine should 
be mostly indifferent to a wide range of alpha between [0.3, 2.0].  
But, given the search engine‟s indifference, higher alpha settings 
in the range may be attractive since they create additional value 
for searchers and advertisers. 
Finally, we should note that we ran additional simulations to test 
the sensitivity of our model to some of the parameters.  In 
particular, we looked at a wide range of variations in the 
correlation between value and relevance as well as several smaller 
variations in how much the pollution effect shifts the CTR 
distribution of the advertisements as alpha changes.  We 
discovered that the results are not sensitive to small variations in 
the correlation between value and relevance, but are somewhat 
sensitive to variations in the pollution effect.   
For example, if the shifts in the CTR distributions as alpha 
changes are 20% lower than what we assumed, the optimal 
settings of alpha to maximize revenue drops to the range [0.2, 
0.5], peaking at 0.4, but allowing settings as high as 1.1 with only 
a modest loss in revenue.  In the other direction, we found that if 
the shift in the CTR distributions are 20% higher, then the revenue 
curve in Figure 7 changes to slope upward beyond an alpha of 1, 
suggesting that alpha in the range [1,2] is optimal.  These shifts in 
the revenue curves from varying the magnitude of the pollution 
effect are  shown in Figure 11 below. 
   
 
Figure 11: Normalized total revenue for alpha in [-2,2] 
showing the sensitivity of the total revenue to magnitude of the 
shift in the CTR distribution as alpha changes. 
The modest sensitivity of the model to the magnitude of the 
pollution effect suggests a need for more empirical data on the 
exact nature of the effect, especially at higher alpha settings.  
However, one can still conclude both that a pollution effect has a 
substantial impact on the choice of ranking function and that 
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reasonable models of the pollution effect suggest using alpha of at 
least 1 for the ranking function. 
8. DISCUSSION 
The goal of our work is to examine the impact of the pollution 
effect.  We suspect that bad advertisements not only impact 
themselves, but all other advertisements, primarily by causing 
people who see irrelevant advertisements to reduce their 
likelihood of looking at advertisements in the future. 
We wanted to use as simple of a model as possible that still 
captured information we have from empirical data about typical 
advertising auctions and how searchers behave in advertising 
auctions.  We sought a model of the pollution effect that would 
not require changes to how search engines currently rank 
advertisements in their auctions, but would still show the impact 
irrelevant advertisements have on searcher behavior and other 
advertisers.  The model we used represents the pollution effect 
with modest shifts in the CTR distribution as the alpha setting of 
ranking functions of the form 𝐵𝑖𝑑 × 𝐶𝑇𝑅∝. 
Our most important results for our new model are represented in 
Figures 7-10.  These results are for the most realistic settings.  We 
used the relevance distribution, value distribution, and correlation 
between value and relevance distribution that was observed in 
Yahoo data.  We then shifted the relevance distribution as alpha 
changed to model the pollution effect.  The results show that 
revenue is optimized with any alpha in the range [0.3, 2.0], but 
that higher alpha values in that range yield higher relevance and 
efficiency, benefiting searchers and advertisers. 
Given that most search engines currently order by 𝐵𝑖𝑑 × 𝐶𝑇𝑅 – 
using an alpha of 1 – this result is surprising.  It suggests that most 
search engines may be missing an opportunity to improve the 
usefulness of their advertising to searchers and advertisers without 
any long-term impact to revenue. 
To further understand the importance of modeling the pollution 
effect, it is also instructive to compare the results in Figures 7-10 
with Figures 4-6.  Figures 4-6 reproduce the previous work and 
show the total revenue, efficiency, and relevance without 
modeling the pollution effect; Figures 7-10 include the pollution 
effect.   The conclusion in previous work about the optimal setting 
of alpha is quite different.  If we assume that relevance remains 
unchanged as alpha changes, as previous work did, the results are 
that an alpha near 0 optimizes revenue.  However, once we 
recognize that lower settings of alpha will tend to show irrelevant 
ads and will make searchers view and click on advertisements less 
frequently – the pollution effect – we find much higher values of 
alpha optimize revenue.  In addition, we find that it is now 
possible to optimize revenue, efficiency, and relevance 
simultaneously with setting of alpha at or above 1. 
Although at least one major search engine used an alpha of 0 in 
the past, our new model confirms that the higher alpha setting of 1 
now commonly used is much closer to optimizing revenue.  It is 
possible that search engines discovered experimentally that a 
higher alpha setting does optimize long-term revenue; this would 
explain why almost all search engines now use the higher setting.  
We take this agreement between the conclusions of our model and 
what is done in practice as evidence for the importance of 
modeling the pollution effect and as support for the validity of our 
model of the pollution effect. 
The conclusions of our model go beyond what search engines 
currently implement, suggesting that an alpha settings above 1 
may be desirable.  Some search engines recently appear to be 
experimenting with higher penalties for irrelevant advertising – 
Google‟s Ad Quality [11] measure could be seen as a increasing 
the importance of relevance when ranking ads and thereby 
charging irrelevant advertisements more – and, if the conclusions 
of our model are a guide, we expect their experiments to be 
fruitful. 
9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Our model of the pollution effect suggests that it is possible to 
simultaneously maximize value for search engines, searchers, and 
advertisers by favoring relevant advertisements and penalizing 
less relevant advertisements. 
The primary conclusion of our work is that the pollution effect 
can dramatically change which ranking rule yields optimal 
revenue for a search engine. When ranking advertisements by 
𝐵𝑖𝑑 × 𝐶𝑇𝑅∝, an alpha setting of 0 appears to be optimal without a 
pollution effect, but a wide range of alpha settings between [0.3, 
2.0] equally maximize revenue with the pollution effect.  
Moreover, with a pollution effect, settings of alpha at 1 or higher 
also appear to maximize the relevance of the advertising for 
searchers and the efficiency of the advertising for advertisers.   
Most search engines currently use an alpha of 1 when ranking 
advertisements.  Our work suggests that higher alpha values could 
be used without impacting revenue.  Search engines that 
experiment with higher alpha settings may be able to improve the 
relevance of their advertising for searchers and the value of the 
advertising to advertisers while also maximizing long-term 
revenue. 
Our work demonstrates that it is important to consider the impact 
bad advertisements may have on other advertisements – the 
pollution effect – and suggests that advertisements are irrelevant 
should pay an additional penalty – a pollution tax – beyond what 
most search engines currently charge.  We presented a simple but 
plausible model for the pollution effect, showed how changing the 
alpha to higher values can represent a pollution tax by changing 
irrelevant advertisements more, and showed how including the 
pollution effect can result in dramatically different conclusions 
about the optimal ranking of advertisements.     
In the future, we would like to gather detailed empirical data on 
the pollution effect to better understand the long-term costs of 
showing less relevant advertising.  We hope this data could be 
used for more sophisticated models of the pollution effect, 
especially for higher alpha settings, and allow us to better 
determine optimal rank ordering of advertising.  In particular, we 
suspect that we may be able to narrow the range of alpha that 
optimizes revenue and may be able to develop a more detailed 
understanding of how to balancing the goals of the search engine 
(revenue), the searchers (relevance), and the advertisers 
(efficiency - revenue). 
Finally, we would like to confirm the conclusions of our model on 
a live advertising engine.  Our model makes several abstractions 
and assumptions – including that the CTR is an accurate measure 
of relevance for searchers, advertisers know their value and 
always bid rationally, and an accurate estimate of CTR is always 
known – that can be violated in practice.  With live tests, we may 
be able to discover flaws in our current model that could be 
addressed in new models.    
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